China’s Role in Asia
– Research Approaches in Germany and Japan –

The German Association for Asian Studies (DGA) and the Japanese Association for Asian Studies (JAAS) are comparable associations of researchers in many fields, as for example in size, research areas, and relation to their respective governments. But they have not cooperated in the past. The Japanese-German Center Berlin (JDZB), a bilateral foundation that is supported by both the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the German Foreign Office, took the initiative to suggest a joint symposium and have a workshop of both associations on new approaches to Asian Studies in Germany and Japan. The initial event is a symposium on “China’s Role in Asia”. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation supports the symposium, inviting Dr. Rolf Mützenich (Member of the German Parliament, Chairman of the German-Japanese Parliamentarian Group) and providing resources in various ways. Within a very limited time for preparation the workshop and symposium have now been arranged for July 7 and 8. We are most grateful to the chairpersons, speakers and everybody who was involved in the preparation, especially Prof. Chiharu Takenaka and her staff, who shouldered the biggest work-load. That the invitation to the symposium met with an unexpected and overwhelming number of applications encourages us to expand our cooperation. We sincerely hope that these efforts will contribute to joint research and further conferences in the future.

Dr. Friederike Bosse (JDZB)
Dr. Wolfgang Brenn (JDZB/DGA)
Prof. Dr. Claudia Derichs (DGA)
Prof. Dr. Sven Saaler (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Tokyo)
Dr. Margot Schüller (DGA)

We, members of Japan Association for Asian Studies (JAAS), are tremendously honoured to hold this symposium on “China’s Role in Asia: Research Approached in Germany and Japan” at International House of Japan, in collaboration with the German Association for Asian Studies (DGA), sponsored by the Japanese-German Center Berlin and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. We are also grateful for the generous support from Asahi Shimbun, International House of Japan and Centre for Asian Area Studies of Rikkyo University. Leading members of GAAS and JAAS have agreed that it is absolutely necessary for us to enrich our intellectual collaboration in order to tackle with crucial challenges in this rapidly changing world, especially Asia. We sincerely hope that this is a beginning of our beautiful friendship in the 21st century.

Akio Takahara, Ex-President of JAAS
Yoshiaki Kaneko, President of JAAS
Chiharu Takenaka, Vice-President of JAAS
◆ PROGRAMME ◆

International Symposium
China’s Role in Asia
– Research Approaches in Germany and Japan –
July 8, 2012(Sun.)13:00-17:00
Lecture Hall, Annex Building 2nd floor
International House of Japan
(mainly in English; Simultaneous Translation into Japanese is available.)

13.00 Welcome Remarks:
Ambassador Yushu Takashima (President of the Japanese-German Center Berlin [JDZB])
Prof. Claudia Derichs
(Deputy Chairwoman of Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Asienkunde [DGA]; Marburg University)
Prof. Yoshiki Kaneko (President of JAAS; Dokkyo University)

Opening Remark:
Ambassador Dr. Volker Stanzel (Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Tokyo)

13.30 Keynote Speeches: Facing a Rising China, Conflict or Cooperation?
Chair: Dr. Margot Schüller
(Vice Director of Institute of Asian Studies at German Institute of Global and Area Studies [GIGA])
Speakers: Dr. Rolf Mützenich
(Member of the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany; the Chairman of German-Japanese Parliamentary Group)
Prof Ryosei Kokubun (President of National Defence Academy of Japan)

14.00 Session 1: China’s Domestic Policy Challenges
Chair: Prof. Ryosei Kokubun
Speakers: Prof. Akio Takahara (The University of Tokyo)
Prof. Sebastian Heilmann (Trier University)

14.50-15.10 Coffee Break

15.10 Session 2: China in the Integrating East Asian Economies
Chair: Dr. Wolfgang Brenn (Head of the project management (conference division) of JDZB)
Speakers: Dr. Margot Schüller
Prof. Hideo Ohashi (Senshu University)

16.10 Session 3: China’s Foreign Policy in Asia
Chair: Prof. Chiharu Takenaka (Rikkyo University)
Speakers: Prof. Kiichi Fujiwara (The University of Tokyo)
Dr. Nele Noesselt (Research fellow of GIGA)

16.55 Closing Remark
Prof. Sven Saaler (Japan Representative of Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Tokyo)
◆プログラム◆

日独・国際シンポジウム
「アジアにおける中国の新たな役割」

2012年7月8日(日) 13:00～17:00
国際文化会館 別館2階講堂
使用言語：英語（日本語への同時通訳）

歓迎の辞
高島 有終（ベルリン日独センター総裁・元駐独大使）
クラウディア・デーリヒス（ドイツアジア学会副理事長・マールブルク大学教授）
金子 芳樹（アジア政経学会理事長・独協大学教授）

開会の辞
フォルカー・シュタンツェル（駐日ドイツ大使）

基調講演　台頭する中国とどう向き合うか、対立か協調か
司会　マルゴット・シュラー（GIGAアジア研究所副所長）
報告　ロルフ・ミュッツェニヒ（ドイツ連邦議会議員、日独議員連盟会長）
国分 良成（防衛大学校長）

セッション 1 中国の内政とその変動
司会　国分 良成
報告　高原 明生（東京大学教授）
セバスティアン・ハイルマン（トリアー大学教授）

休憩（14:50～15:10）

セッション 2 東アジア地域経済の中の中国
司会　ヴォルフガンク・ブレン（ベルリン日独センタープロジェクトマネージメント部長）
報告　マルゴット・シュラー
大橋 英夫（専修大学教授）

セッション 3 中国の外交とアジア
司会　竹中 千春（立教大学教授）
報告　藤原 帰一（東京大学教授）
ネレ・ネッセルト（GIGAアジア研究所フェロー）

閉会の辞
スヴェン・サーラ（F・エーベルト財団東京代表、上智大学准教授）
Welcome Remarks

*Speakers*

Yushu Takashima （高島 有終）
(President of the Japanese-German Center Berlin)

Claudia Derichs （クラウディア・デーリヒス）
(Vice President of the German Association for Asian Studies)

Yoshiki Kaneko （金子 芳樹）
(President of Japan Association for Asian Studies)
== Profile ==

Yushu Takashima

Yushu Takashima is President of the Japanese-German Center Berlin (JDZB) since May 2002. He is a career diplomat. After graduating from Faculty of Law, Kyoto University, he entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1964. He served as Minister at the Japanese Embassy in Indonesia and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1980s. After serving as Deputy Director-General of the European and Oceanian Affairs Bureau from 1990, he was appointed Director General in 1992 at the Defence Agency. He further served as Director General of the Intelligence and Analysis Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before becoming Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Albania in 1996. He served as Vice-President of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) since 1999 and then as Ambassador in Germany from 2002 to 2005.

Claudia Derichs

Claudia Derichs is a full professor for Comparative Politics and International Development Studies at the University of Marburg, Germany, and an appointed member of AcademiaNet (http://www.academia-net.de/), a network profiling Germany’s most outstanding female scientists. She is Vice President of the German Association for Asian Studies and has published various books and articles on Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan and the Arab world, and is an advisor to several academic and political institutions, journals and think tanks. Recent publication: Women and Politics in Asia. A Springboard for democracy? Co-ed. A. Fleschenberg. Singapore: ISEAS

Yoshiki Kaneko

Yoshiki Kaneko, Dr. is Professor of Foreign Studies at Dokkyo University, specialized in Southeast Asian Studies and Ethnic Politics in Asia. He received his Ph.D. in Comparative Politics from Keio University. He has served as President of Japan Association for Asian Studies (JAAS) since November, 2011. His recent publications include Ethnicity and Politics in Malaysia: Chinese Politics and National Integration (Kyoto: Koyo Shobo, 2001, in Japanese), “Malaysia and Singapore: Multi-Ethnic Countries in Globalization”, Nanbu (Southeastern part of) Asia (Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 2011, in Japanese).
Opening Remark

Speaker

Volker Stanzel (フォルカー・シュタンツェル)
(Ambassador, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Tokyo)
== Profile ==

Volker Stanzel

Ambassador Dr. Stanzel is the Hon. Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in Japan. After graduating in Japanese Studies and Sinology from the Universities of Frankfurt/M. and Kyoto and earning a doctorate from the University of Cologne, he joined the Foreign Service in 1979.

His foreign assignments have included Italy, Japan, Hungary, Yemen (Charge d’Affaires), and China (Public Relations). Returning to Germany, he has served at several positions within the Foreign Ministry, among these Director GENERAL of the Department for the Relations with the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia from 2002 – 2004. From 2004 to 2007, he has served as the Federal Republic of Germany’s Ambassador to China. Before becoming Ambassador to Japan in 2009, he was the Political Director of the German Foreign Ministry.
Keynote Speeches

Facing a Rising China, Conflict or Cooperation?

Chair
Margot Schüller
（マルゴット・シュラー）

Speakers
Rolf Mützenich
（ロルフ・ミュッツェニヒ）
Ryosei Kokubun
（国分 良成）
== Profile ==

Margot Schüller (マルゴット・シュラー)

Dr. Margot Schüller is Senior Research Fellow at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) and Deputy Director of the GIGA, Institute of Asian Studies. She is regular lecturer on Chinese and East Asian economics at universities in Germany and abroad and a frequent consulter for governmental and private institutions. Her current research focusses on China’s economic development, especially the transition of the banking and state sector, and its economic relations with neighbouring countries in Asia, China’s innovation system, and the globalization of Chinese companies.


Rolf Mützenich (ロルフ・ミュッツェニヒ)

Dr. Rolf Mützenich is a member of the German Bundestag for the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). Dr. Mützenich has been a member of the SPD since 1976 and has worked extensively in the field of politics as a member of staff to several members of the German Parliament and the State Parliament of his home state of Nordrhein-Westfalen. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Bremen in 1991. In 2002 he got elected to the German Bundestag where he has worked in the field of foreign and security policy ever since. In 2009 he became Foreign Affairs Spokesman for the Parliamentary Social Democratic Party and chairman of the German-Japanese Parliamentary group of the Bundestag. Dr. Mützenich lives in his home town of Cologne and is married with two children.

Ryosei Kokubun (国分 良成)

Ryosei Kokubun(Ph.D.) is president of National Defense Academy of Japan since April 2012. He is former Dean of Faculty of Law and Politics at Keio University. After completing his undergraduate and graduate courses of Keio University, he began teaching there in 1981, became Associate Professor in 1985, Professor in 1992 and Director of Institute of East Asian Studies in 1999-2007. He was a visiting scholar at Harvard University, The University of Michigan, Fudan University, Beijing University and National Taiwan University. His research interest is Chinese politics and international relations in East Asia. He is former president of The Japan Association of International Relations and The Japan Association for Asian Studies. He edited Challenges for China-Japan-US Cooperation, Japan Center for International Exchange(JCIE, 1998), The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order, JCIE(2004), Sino-Japanese Relations: The Need for Conflict Prevention and Management, Cambridge Scholars Publishing(2008), and Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-US Relations(Japan Center for International Exchange, 2010).
Facing a Rising China, Conflict or Cooperation

Rolf Mützenich
(Member of the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany; the Chairman of German-Japanese Parliamentarian Group)

The theme of a rising china is highly topical. The 21st century sees Asia shifting towards centre stage in the global economy and in international politics. Half a millennium of Western dominance is at an end, and a new power constellation is taking shape. The United States and China – and presumably India too in the future – are the key players in this new configuration. What is certain is that the G20 countries, through their economic upsurge, have also become new centres of political power. They themselves lay claim to a more active role in shaping international politics. Accordingly, they can and must assume greater responsibility too. The political role of Asia on the world stage has not yet started to reflect the growth in its economic importance. The fact is that the regional and global challenges facing us would be practically insuperable without Chinese cooperation. Unlike Europe, Asia has no cooperative institutions covering the entire continent. Bilateral structures predominate, and multilateralism is not yet firmly rooted.

There is an obvious need for Asia and Europe to address global challenges, such as climate change, the debt crisis and nuclear proliferation, together. To this end, we need a fair and just world order. A just global order will also entail strengthening and restructuring the relevant institutions. Germany supports a reform of the Security Council that would give considerably more weight to Asia. The G8 and the G20 are important informal coordinating bodies but are no alternative to the United Nations. They can support the United Nations but can never replace it, for they do not possess the necessary legitimacy. The key to the establishment of peaceful international relations will be the ability of the last superpower, the United States, and the new global power, China, together with the European Union and Japan, to agree in the G20 framework on the cooperative shaping of a global order.
Evaluating the Hu Jintao’s Era: 2002-2012

Ryosei Kokubun
(President, National Defense Academy of Japan)

Construction of “Harmonious Society”: Increasing Difficulties
- widening gaps in various fields and increasing people’s frustration and protests
- slow development of social welfare: lack of income redistribution
- high growth to low growth: babble, unemployment, trade and FDI…. weak domestic demand
- increasing corruption by vested interest groups: “iron triangle”

Peaceful Rise in International Community
- failure in assertive diplomacy in 2010: challenge for the “Beijing consensus”
- peaceful cross straight relations but no vision for the unification
- strategic partnership with US under economic crisis but increasing mistrust
- DPRK’s development in nuclear and missiles: failure of six-party talks?
- increasing frictions with ASEAN nations under maritime expansion
- worsening relations under strategic and mutually beneficial relationship with Japan

Unpaved Way to the 18th Party Congress
- unfinished Hu Jintao’s projects
- weak Hu Jintao’s leadership under strong influence by Jiang Zemin group and military
- Bo Xilai’s affair as a stage of power struggle to the 18th Congress
- Zhou Yongkang + Liang Guanglie……..the second stage?
- circulated Xi Jinping and “crown prince party”? 
- from Hu Jintao’s era to Hu Jintao era?
- unclear future: increasing problems, weak leadership and lack of the visions
SESSION 1

China's Domestic Policy Challenges

Chair
Ryosei Kokubun
(国分 良成)

Speakers
Akio Takahara
(高原 明生)
Sebastian Heilmann
(セバスティアン・ハイルマン)
== Profile ==

Ryosei Kokubun (国分 良成)

Ryosei Kokubun (Ph.D.) is president of National Defense Academy of Japan since April 2012. He is former Dean of Faculty of Law and Politics at Keio University. After completing his undergraduate and graduate courses of Keio University, he began teaching there in 1981, became Associate Professor in 1985, Professor in 1992 and Director of Institute of East Asian Studies in 1999-2007. He was a visiting scholar at Harvard University, The University of Michigan, Fudan University, Beijing University and National Taiwan University. His research interest is Chinese politics and international relations in East Asia. He is former president of The Japan Association of International Relations and The Japan Association for Asian Studies. He edited Challenges for China-Japan-US Cooperation, Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE, 1998), The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order, JCIE (2004), Sino-Japanese Relations: The Need for Conflict Prevention and Management, Cambridge Scholars Publishing (2008), and Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-US Relations (Japan Center for International Exchange, 2010).

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Akio Takahara (高原 明生)

Akio Takahara is Professor of Contemporary Chinese Politics at the Graduate School of Law and Politics, University of Tokyo. He received his DPhil in 1988 from the University of Sussex, and later spent several years as Visiting Scholar at the Consulate-General of Japan in Hong Kong (1989-91) and the Japanese Embassy in Beijing (1996-98), and at the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University (2005-06). He currently serves also as senior fellow at the Tokyo Foundation. Before joining the University of Tokyo, he taught at J. F. Oberlin University (1991-95) and Rikkyo University (1995-2005). His research interests include contemporary Chinese politics and its diplomacy. His publications include The Politics of Wage Policy in Post-Revolutionary China, (Macmillan, 1992), and “A Japanese Perspective on China’s Rise and the East Asian Order”, in Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds), China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 2008, pp.218-37.

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Sebastian Heilmann (セバスティアン・ハイルマン)

Sebastian Heilmann is Professor for Comparative Government and the Political Economy of China at the University of Trier, Germany. He has published extensively on China’s political system, political economy and economic policy-making. With Elizabeth J. Perry he co-edited the volume Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China (Harvard University Press, 2011). Currently, he is heading a multi-year project research group on "Industrial and Technology Policies of the People's Republic of China" that is funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research.
China's Domestic Policy Challenges: 
Deep Divide in the Leadership

Akio Takahara
(The University of Tokyo)

A. Serious debates among the leadership over fundamental questions

1. Is there a China Model and should China advocate it?
   ➝ Yes
   * The end of the American Model and the Washington Consensus
     * The current situation in China has never been better after the Opium War
       Basic stability, enhancement in living standards, high international status
   ➝ No
   * Nothing new about the developmental dictatorship or the developmental state
     * The current situation is terrible and China cannot boast of being a Model
       Signs and seeds of instability, widening income gap, worsening nepotism and favouritism,
       corruption, abuse of power (lack of rule of law), environmental degradation, ageing society

2. Is there a universal value?
   ➝ Yes (official position expressed to the outside world)
     * There is, but since China is still developing, it will take time to realise it fully.
       E.g. A clause in the New Japan-China Joint Statement signed by Fukuda and Hu in May 2008 “The
       two countries will closely cooperate to deepen our understanding and to pursue the basic and
       universal rights that are jointly acknowledged by the international society.”; Hu Jingtao’s remarks at
       the joint press conference with President Obama in January 2011, “Human rights have universality.”
   ➝ No (position of the Central Propaganda Department)
     * There are only western values, which they call universal values and try to enforce on us. Those
       western values deny Chinese values and are harmful to China.

3. Should the CCP implement political reform?
   ➝ Yes (Wen Jiabao)
     * Economic reform cannot be completed without political reform.
     * Must let the people criticise and supervise the government.
     * Must solve the unequal distribution of resources regarding education, medical treatment, as well as
       income.
   ➝ No (Wu Bangguo)
     * We should not waver about our fundamental system. If we do, we will fall into the deep abyss of civil
       war.
     * No rotating of power among multiple parties, no pluralisation of ideology, no separation of the three
       branches of the government, no federation, no privatisation
4. Should economic reform be promoted? (Focus: what to do with the oligopoly of the SOEs in the key sectors of the national economy.)

➢ Yes
* Entry of private capital in these sectors is necessary, in order to bring in competition and increase efficiency, and to lower the high, oligopolistic prices, profits and salaries.
* The State Council led by Wen has been advocating this for two years to no avail.

➢ No
* Telecommunications retorted harshly when the DRC announced last November that it was investigating whether to apply the anti-monopoly law to the industry.
* Ideologically unacceptable: further privatisation will undermine the legitimacy of communist rule. NB the basic economic system is the ownership system with public ownership as the mainstay, i.e. the key sectors are owned by the state.

5. Should the party allow the growth of civil society so as to maintain social stability?

➢ Yes
* Not only should NPOs be allowed to develop to protect and promote the interests of the ordinary people, but there is a need for mechanisms to let them express their views, coordinate their interests, solve contradictions, and protect their interests.

➢ No
* “Civil society is a trap designed by the west.” (Zhou Benshun, secretary of the Committee of Political and Legislative Affairs)
* Maintain stability by strengthening social management (i.e. control), including tightening grips over the internet and the SNS.

B. Policy Implications
1. We should support the moderates, reformists, internationalists in these debates.

2. Beware of the rise in exclusive nationalism and imprudent talk about the use of force.

3. We need prudence (not provocation), and dialogue.
Appendix

1. Chinese version of what happened on 7 September 2010

![Chinese version images](http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-09/08/c_12529310.htm)

Left: 8 Sept. at Ishigaki, Okinawa  Right: 15 Sept. at Jinjiang, Fujian

http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0915/TKY201009150452.html

2. Japanese version

Leaked Video Footage: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sVVM2AmvD5U](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sVVM2AmvD5U)

3. Other Images of anti-West, anti-Japanese sentiments

![Other images](http://www.inxian.com/20110619/27417#more-27417)

http://www.inxian.com/20101016/15287
Political Accountability in China: Hierarchical Controls, Social Protest, and Social Media

Sebastian Heilmann
(Trier University)

In the present context of growing tensions between steep popular expectations and possibly decreasing regime outputs, establishing credible mechanisms of political feedback, responsiveness and sanctioning are becoming a more pressing challenge to China's polity.

Beyond output-based legitimation, the challenge of responsible governance lies in holding rulers and officials accountable through: assuming responsibility for their actions; reporting and explaining actions and consequences; revising failing policies; accepting sanctions or dismissal in case of misconduct.

Western constitutionalist standards stand in contrast to alternative mechanisms stressed by the Chinese Communist Party: hierarchical discipline; horizontal checks; expert consultation; civic feedback.

In addition, we find important non-institutionalized mechanisms of accountability in China, in particular social protests and new social media.

Major Trends in the Past Decade
Since the 2000s, efforts at strengthening institutions of accountability have remained patchy and ineffective (as opposed to more concrete progress during the 1980s).

Traditional Leninist institutions are severely weakened: Hierarchical and ideological controls have proven grossly ineffective. Political-economic-military elite networks operate outside of effective controls and above the law.

In China's subnational governance, we find growing partial analogies with post-socialist polities ("stealing the state"), past and present developmental autocracies ("crony capitalism"), and even non-autocratic emerging countries (cf. "land seizures" and their social impact in India, Brazil, Mexico).

The Chinese state's "social management" is undergoing an informal reconfiguration:
・ Emergence of informal compensatory or, depending on local context, (mafiose) repressive mechanisms for dealing with societal demands and complaints.

New social media are having significant effects:
・ Dissemination of officially unapproved, unfiltered news and debates. Cyberpluralism.
・ "Netstorms" trigger political responses, policy/law revisions, sanctions against officials.
・ But do they have the potential to trigger larger protest (beyond "nimby" protests)?

Persisting "shadow of hierarchy" and top-down reform efforts:
・ Top-down sanctions against high-level officials are still possible at any time.
・ There still exist actors that try to defend the party center's "encompassing interest" in power, growth and stability (cf. Mancur Olson).
・ Controversies are going on about the necessity of constitutional reforms to make China's polity less vulnerable to the impact of economic and social crises.
SESSION 2

China in the Integrating East Asian Economies

Chair
Wolfgang Brenn
(ヴォルフガンク・ブレン)

Speakers
Margot Schüller
(マルゴット・シュラー)
Hideo Ohashi
(大橋 英夫)
== Profile ==

Wolfgang Brenn (ヴォルフガンク・ブレン)

Wolfgang Brenn is heading the project management (conference division) of the Japanese-German Center Berlin (JDZB). Before joining the Center he was a Visiting Professor at Rikkyo University, Tokyo (1986-91, Lektorat of the German Academic Exchange Service, DAAD), and teaching at the University of Tokyo (1987-91). He studied German literature, politics and philosophy at Marburg and Frankfurt University and finished his studies with the first and second state examinations for senior high school teachers. Mr Brenn completed his PhD at Frankfurt University in German literature. After his studies he lectured at the University of Liverpool (DAAD-Lektorat, 1982-84) and at the University of Frankfurt/Main (1985-86), where he also pursued research on British ‘Germanistik’ during National Socialism (DAAD research grant). 2004-06 he took leave from the JDZB and joined the Foreign Office to support the staff of the German Embassy in Tokyo for “Germany in Japan 2005/2006”.

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Margot Schüller (マルゴット・シュラー)

Dr. Margot Schüller is Senior Research Fellow at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) and Deputy Director of the GIGA, Institute of Asian Studies. She is regular lecturer on Chinese and East Asian economics at universities in Germany and abroad and a frequent consultant for governmental and private institutions. Her current research focuses on China’s economic development, especially the transition of the banking and state sector, and its economic relations with neighbouring countries in Asia, China’s innovation system, and the globalization of Chinese companies.


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Hideo Ohashi (大橋 英夫)

Hideo Ohashi is Professor of Development Economics and Asian Studies at Senshu University. He was a Research Fellow at Mitsubishi Research Institute, Consulate-General of Japan in Hong Kong, and Japan Institute of International Affairs. He was also an editor of Ajiya Kenkyu (Asian Studies), a quarterly journal of the Japan Association for Asian Studies (JAAS). His publications in Japanese include U.S.-China Trade Friction (Keiso Shobo, 1998), Globalization of China’s Economy (University of Nagoya Press, 2003), and Contemporary Chinese Economy (Iwanami Shoten, 2005).
China’s Role in the Integrating East Asian Economies

Margot Schüller
(Deputy Director of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Institute of Asian Studies)

In my presentation I argue that China has changed from being an observer to a designer of regional integration. China’s regional integration policy was focussed on the ASEAN region. The initiation of the CAFTA demonstrated China’s crucial role in the economic integration of the region. The ASEAN countries seem to pursue a “twin hedging” strategy towards China, deepening integration with China and the one hand, while seeking closer cooperation with the USA and Europe on the other hand.

Closer market-driven economic cooperation between China, Japan and Korea have paved the way for stronger institution-led integration in Northeast Asia. While the ASEAN Member States seem to have accepted China’s leading role in regional integration, Japan and Korea are still struggling to do so. China’s interest in trilateral cooperation is limited to economic cooperation and the establishment of a Trilateral Free Trade Agreement (TFTA). This is also reflected in Prime Minister Wen Jiaobao’s seven point proposal (trade and investment, sustainable development, cultural exchange, post quake reconstruction, nuclear safety, disaster management). In contrast, political issues such as the North Korea’s security challenge or historical and territorial differences between China-ROK-Japan versus political trust building are not included.
China’s Role in the Integrating East Asian Economies

Hideo Ohashi
(Senshu University)

1. Changing Economic Order in East Asia
From “Flying Geese” to “Leaping Frog”
(1) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Management Resource Flows
(2) Fragmentation of Production Process of Modular Products
(3) Vertical Intra-Industry Trade and Just in Time (JIT) System

2. Changing China’s Economy
From Investment and Export to Consumption and Domestic-Led Economy
(1) Reducing Efficiency of Domestic Economy
(2) Growing Global Imbalances
(3) Shift in Development Mode

3. Changing Economic Relations between China and East Asia
From “the Factory of the World” to “the Market of the World”
(1) China’s Dominance in East Asian Economies
(2) Triangular Trade between East Asia, China and the U.S. & the EU
(3) China as a Final Demand Generator
SESSION 3

China’s Foreign Policy in Asia

Chair
Chiharu Takenaka
（竹中 千春）

Speakers
Kiichi Fujiwara
（藤原 帰一）
Nele Noesselt
（ネレ・ネッセルト）
== Profile ==

Chiharu Takenaka （竹中 千春）

Chiharu Takenaka is Professor at Faculty of Law and Politics, Rikkyo University, specialized in International Politics, Comparative Politics, South Asian Studies and Gender Studies. She is Vice-President of Japan Association for Asian Studies (JAAS) and Councilor of the International House of Japan. Her recent works include Why Can’t the World Get Along? To Stop the Chain of Violence （Tokyo: Hankyu Communications, 2004, in Japanese); The Bandit History of India: Empire, the State and Outlaws （Tokyo: Yushisha, 2010, in Japanese）, which was awarded the Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Prize in 2011.

Kiichi Fujiwara （藤原 帰一）

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More than half century after Organski published his seminal work, power transition has emerged as the dominant framework in explaining the security challenges that the East Asian region face today. There is no denial, of course, about China’s rise and Japan’s decline, or for that matter, a more relative decline of US power. I doubt, however, if power transition, at least in the original form as advocated, is the more appropriate framework in explaining the region. Here I would like to call your attention to two basic frameworks that may be employed in addressing the issues related to regional security, namely, power transition and security dilemma.

**Power Transition**

Power transition is a model that attracted little attention when it was first proposed by A.F.K. Organski in his World Politics, possibly because his notion that the stability of an international order is composed of and managed by a dominant power stood so clearly against realist understandings of international politics, which had little room for ideas such as hegemony. His argument enjoyed a belated welcome in the 1980’s, a period flooded with notions of the decline of the United States and the resulting fear that a loss of American hegemony may cause unprecedented instability in world affairs. Then again, with a revived trust of American leadership in the latter half of the 80’s, the power transition model, with its ominous predictions of hegemonic wars, retreated from public attention.

In this light, the current revival of power transition theories is clearly a reflection of the rise of China. No wonder there. While the rise of Japan and West Germany was essentially a rise of economies that were (and are) militarily dependent on American military capability, and while the rise of Soviet military power did not accompany an economic rise, China’s rise today is the first occasion after the end of the Second World War where a power is rising both in the economic and military fields.

Most of the discussions on power transition has centered on which of the two are more likely to be destabilizing, the rising or the declining power. As many critics have noted, there is ample reason to anticipate aggressive action taken by the declining power versus the rising power, and not the other way round. But such discussion misses one important point: the consequences from the rise of economic power and the rise of military power can be quite different.

The rise of a military power will, almost by definition, cause alarm among her neighbors, as such rise may significantly weaken their defense. The possible outcome here is the emergence or tightening of alliances against the rising military power, a consequence that follow the classic notion of
the balance of power. The rise of an economic power, on the other hand, need not invite such anxieties and alliance formation. An expanding economy, after all, is an opportunity for surrounding powers, so long as an open access to the market is guaranteed. Here the question is not whether that rising power should be contained, but whether that rising power can be incorporated into the existing economic institution in a manner that works to the benefit of dominant powers. This also means that economic rise of a power may not necessarily end in isolating that power from the rest. Powers may rise in either the military or the economic sphere, but the outcomes can be dramatically different.

True, China is rising in both spheres, but her rise in economy is more salient than in the geopolitical sphere. China has taken over Japan’s position as the second largest economy in the world, and her relative gap toward the United States is rapidly shrinking. In the military sphere, however, China’s relative strength as compared to the United States is still quite modest. The manpower has always been significant, but the arsenal is still quite underdeveloped. China’s nuclear submarines, or the nuclear capability in general, lags behind not only the US but also Russia. China, moreover, lacks an alliance network. Regardless of the rhetoric employed by a couple of Chinese generals, Beijing could not take any action in face of the joint US-Korean military exercises that included Japanese officers as observers, which was held in November to December 2010, which in the Yellow Sea. Of course it is true that the growth rate of China’s arsenal is extremely high, but that also means that most of the alarms toward China’s military capability is a projection toward the future, and the fact still remains that China’s relative military position is quite modest in face of a consolidated action of the Western allies.

China’s reaction is also quite different. Although China’s military superiority is quite limited, a few generals from the PLA have drawn an ambitious map of China as a major maritime power; although China’s economic power is immense, the managers of Chinese economy have repeatedly pointed out in international gatherings that China is still a ‘developing nation.’ The contrast between the pride illustrated by the generals and the modesty of the technocrats is quite striking, but also understandable. A major maritime power may aspire to win recognition and respect from others, but a posture of a major economic power will only invite more pressures for international economic cooperation and, to put it simply, more policy adjustments and more contributions to the international community chest that is required for the management of crisis-prone global economy.

I do accept some of the thesis put forward by the advocates of power transition theories, but I also do not think we need to be alarmist in face of the changes in global power distribution. To the extent that China’s rise is more salient in the economic sphere as compared to the military sphere, we have far more time and space for mutual understanding and conflict aversion than the proponents of power transition may lead us to believe.

Security Dilemma

Security dilemma is known by Robert Jervis’s seminal World Politics article, but is actually quite an old concept that date back several more decades; one just has to read the works of Louis Halle or L.F. Richardson to see that two nations without particular belligerent intentions may end in antagonistic
relations. The concept, however, found the largest audience in the days of the Cold War, where many were concerned over the possibility of the Russo-American arms race developing into uncontrollable escalation. With the end of the Cold War, attention toward the security dilemma model seems to have receded, as the collapse of the Soviet Union eased such concerns as a possible world war. Unlike Russia, China was essentially perceived as a regional power, with little chances of developing into a major security threat toward the US or Europe.

The story was different, however, at the regional level. Japan has been more alarmed over the rise of China’s military capability, and has responded to her naval buildup by strengthening her maritime capabilities. The story may have seemed different from the Chinese perspective, as Japan’s naval expansion was not perceived as a reaction toward China’s naval buildup, but a cause for building China’s naval capacity, possibly enhanced by a stronger concern to Japan’s military expansion as compared to that of the US, for the obvious reason being that Japan was the aggressor toward China in the last war. In other words, there seem to be good reason to believe that, at the regional level, the security dilemma may have been already at action at the East Asian regional level, along with its almost inevitable consequence, the arms race.

I doubt if the US has taken China’s military expansion in the last two decades as a direct threat to her mainland. The gap of military capability between the two powers was still considerably large, while the 911 attacks led the US to focus on ‘the war on terror.’ As the gap narrowed considerably in the past two decades, this neglect also seem to be reconsidered, with more concerned voices from Washington focusing on the maritime activities of the PLA. There are alarming signs that the security dilemma might be expanding from the regional level to the global level.

Much of the same terrain may be covered by the power transition literature, but there is a significant difference in focus: while power transition theories highlight the changes in the distribution of powers as such, security concern theories take the mutual perception and intent of the concerned nations to be central. For students of security dilemma, even if all nations assume themselves to be the defenders of the status quo, and essentially passive in her geopolitical concerns, that alone is insufficient in bringing political stability, because if the powers also assume the arms buildup of the other to be possibly more belligerent and a challenge to the status quo, the rational choice here would be to work on that worst case scenario. And if, furthermore, all concerned parties work on such worst case scenario, the result will be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

What is more troublesome is that the definition of the status quo can be a matter of debate. Many borderline disputes remain in East Asia; the Spratlis islands, Senkaku-Diaoyu, or Takeshima-Docto are the more salient flash points at the moment, but we must also remember that the recognition of Taiwan remains a contested matter. As in territorial conflicts elsewhere, the concerned parties tend to perceive themselves to be merely forwarding a legitimate claim, while that very claim will be taken as an aggressive challenge to the status quo. Diverse interpretation of the status quo, therefore, may accelerate anxieties among the powers, and thus enhancing the security dilemma.

Is there any way out? It is indeed strange, and even silly, to see nations that are devoid of belligerent intent or interests still engaged in mutual security anxieties, but such is the rational outcome of the security dilemma. What we need here is a combination of conflict resolution and confidence
building, and here arms control may serve as a key. As evidenced in the last days of the Russo-American Cold War, attempts toward arms control, if successful, can result significant reduction of mutual anxieties and tension, which is in itself a major achievement, even when no actual significant reduction of the arsenal takes place. Transparency and openness, even limited, that will accompany an arms control regime go a long way for stability: the political capital that had been build out of the SALT I/II agreements not only worked to limit the escalation of conflict after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and also prepared groundwork for the reversal of mutually antagonistic policies in the late 1980’s.

I am not arguing that the security dilemma model is superior to the power transition model; far from it. I wish point out, however, that the discussions on power transitions do not lead to much policy alternatives, as their premise is based on the hard data of power distribution. Security dilemma, on the other hand, is essentially a model of phycology, one that focus on mutual anxieties and suspicion, which can lead to concrete proposals that we can work on.

The Domestic Origins of Foreign Policy

I would like to end this essay with a different and a more controversial note: what role will domestic public opinion play in the regional order? I do not have a good answer, but allow me to point out some concerns.

First, domestic public opinion may project the image of a belligerent enemy in a more extreme manner than the governments. Take, for example, the history debate. Many have argued that Japan’s amnesia over her responsibility in World War II was caused by government propaganda, while the public remained ignorant about historical realities; revisionist nationalists in Japan argue that the Chinese government is responsible for what they see as ungrounded blame toward Japan’s wartime aggression. While there is no denial that governments have played crucial roles in the shaping of the public memories of war, I disagree to such assertions, as the public in both China and Japan has been as extreme as, and in many cases more extreme than, the views expressed by their own governments. The idea that the civil society is more enlightened than the government in the field of foreign policy is, although noble, may not hold water; an agitated domestic public opinion, in turn, may limit the opportunities that are open to the governments in facing their neighbors.

That, I think, is the last challenge. In the example of the British and French encounter in Fashoda, both governments were quite reserved in their initial reaction to each other; it was the public opinion, especially in France, that made a diplomatic solution to the crisis more difficult. In the present day, many of the rivalries and contention between China and Japan have been highlighted and enhanced in the media, producing an exaggerated image of an inevitable conflict. Thus we reach the old problem of Harold Nicolson: how can we manage public opinion without silencing it by fiat? I confess I do not have an answer to this final problem, but this may be a more pressing issue at the moment in East Asia.
China’s Foreign Policy in Asia

Nele Noesselt  
(GIGA Institute of Asian Studies)

1. General principles, shifting priorities in China’s foreign policy  
   (historical dimension; comparison Maoist period / reform era / 4th generation of political leaders)  
   a) Japan, Korea  
   b) India  
   c) South-East Asia

2. China as a “regional” power: Challenges and opportunities for the Asian region  
   (convergence / divergence of interests; conflicts / disputes /cooperation)

3. China and multilateral cooperation frameworks (transnational political and security issues)

Conclusion / outlook  
- Growing assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy?  
- Paradigm shift in Chinese foreign policy: Acceptance of multilateralism?  
- New security constellations: Role of the US as a “pacific power”, China's strategic responses, competing spheres of interests /hubs-and-spokes systems
Closing Remark

*Speaker*

Sven Saaler (スヴェン・サーラ)
(Japan Representative of Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Tokyo)
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Sven Saaler is Associate Professor of Modern Japanese History at Sophia University in Tôkyô. He was formerly Head of the Humanities Section of the German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) and Associate Professor at The University of Tokyo. He has written a monograph on history debates in Japan (Politics, Memory and Public Opinion, 2005) and articles on the history textbook controversy, the Yasukuni question and the historical development and significance of Pan-Asianism. Together with J. Victor Koschmann, he has edited Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History (Routledge, 2007), with Wolfgang Schwentker The Power of Memory in Modern Japan (Global Oriental, 2008) and with Christopher W. A. Szpilman Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History (Rowman & Littlefield, 2011). He also is co-author of Impressions of an Imperial Envoy. Karl von Eisendecher in Meiji Japan (in German and Japanese, 2007) and of Under Eagle Eyes: Lithographs, Drawings and Photographs from the Prussian Expedition to Japan, 1860-61 (in German, Japanese and English, 2011). His research also has been translated into Korean, Chinese, French and Armenian.
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URL: (http://www.rikkyo.ne.jp/grp/ajiken/)

日本学術振興会科学研究費補助金
基盤研究(A)(2011-2013年度)
「広域アジアの市民社会構築とその国際政治的課題」
(研究代表者 竹中千春)
Building Civil Society in Asia and its Challenge for International Society
URL: (http://www2.rikkyo.ac.jp/web/takenakac/kaken/)

発行日 2012年7月8日

発行者 アジア政経学会国際シンポジウム開催事務局
立教大学法学部竹中千春研究室
〒171-8501 東京都豊島区西池袋3-34-1

編集 今村 真紀 松浦 直子
表紙デザイン 村田 祐子